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Abstract 
 In this article first conventional definitions and the major traditional theories of self and identity are summarized.  Because 
immigrant identity is central to other processes they too are summarized.  They include the concepts of integration, assimilation, 
acculturation, adaptation, adjustment, and adoption.  It is important and useful to review the distinctions made between 
integration and assimilation as well as the distinctions between self and identity that exist in the conventional sociology and 
psychology literature.  Too often these concepts are confused or used as synonyms.   
 Then a final section presents a discussion of contemporary theories of immigrant identity specifically and the widely 
observed process of enclaving, which manifests in-group and out-group identification.  The theories of cultural fusion, semantic 
field theory, and dimensional accrual and dissociation are summarized and applied to the phenomenon of immigrant identity. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Self 
 A person who was not very proficient in English once 
complained that all they wanted was “Piece of brain.  Piece 
of brain.”  What they meant to say was “peace of mind.”  The 
self is not identical with the physical brain.  Rather, the self 
is seen as a phenomenon in flux, a never “finished” product.  
The self is comprised of a constitutive core called 
consciousness, which synthesizes information.  What we call 
experience or awareness results from that synthesis.  The self 
and consciousness are not the same thing.  Consciousness is 
basically awareness.  I can be conscious of my self just as I 
am aware of others.  To the constitutive core, or 
consciousness, all information is equal.   
 There are basically four kinds of information we are 
aware of.  They are memorial information (memory), 
affective information (emotion), cognitive information 
(reason), and sensational information (of the senses).  All 
of these kinds of information are actively combined by our 
consciousness.  This process is called synthesis and it leads 
to a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.  In other 
words, consciousness generates an awareness characterized 
by synergy.  The synthetically active core continually 
recombines old and new information generating minute to 
minute, what we call reality.  This continual stream of 
information is organized by the synthetic process and 
constituted into meaningful experience.  At the same time, 
the new information continually reorients the self, which is 
also a constitutive product of active consciousness.  
Consciousness as a process is not the same thing as the self.   
 The constitutive self is a never finished product, a multi-
dimensional field where various differences continually 
converge and integrate.  Thus, am I short?  Short is 
dependent on tall.  Am I rich?  Rich is dependent on poor.  
Am I smart?  I cannot be smart without the existence of 
stupidity.  The self is a constantly shifting convergence of 
traces of differences.  If I am standing among a group of 
professional basketball players, I am short.  If I am standing 
among a group primary school children I am tall.   
 The self or identity is a constantly shifting product of 
difference.  It may be the case that I am regarded as a very 
literate even eloquent person in my home country within my 
primary linguistic community, but then when I enter another 
linguistic community I suddenly become illiterate and 
inarticulate.  Because personal status and source credibility 
have very much to do with communicative competence and 
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eloquence, I may be a high status person at home but a low 
status person abroad, and this may be very difficult for me 
to accept (Giles and Johnson, 1981).  I may even attribute 
my sudden change in status on the stupidity and arrogance 
of the host culture (Jones and Nisbett, 1972).  “Don’t they 
know who I am!  How dare they treat me this way!”  Well, 
the fact is that what you are to the host is an illiterate.  And 
as if that is not bad enough, because you cannot 
communicate well, it is very difficult for the host to get to 
know the “real you” and vice versa. 
 
 The Onion Model of the Self. The way the self is 
organized by the constitutive core consciousness is in layers 
of identification.  When you completely identify with 
someone or something else that means that you are identical 
emotionally speaking.  For instance, when I see my pet dog, 
that I love very much, kicked by a mean person, I do not have 
to stop and think about what is happening.  I am instantly 
hurt and very angry, perhaps also frightened that my dog is 
injured.  In another case, when I watch a beloved family 
member suffering through a terrible medical crisis, I am very 
sad and hurt too.  Compassion means to suffer with.  
Empathy (Titchener, 1909; Wispe, 1991) means to identify 
with another or to be identical with another.  While empathy 
means to project oneself into the other’s situation, sympathy 
means to feel for the other but not necessarily to identify with 
the other.   
 Psychologists (Gruen and Mendelsohn, 1986; Langer, 
1972) have discovered that when individuals feel empathy 
for another, their responses tend to use the same muscles and 
reactions as the person or thing they are observing.  In the 
case of sympathy, similar muscles are used but not the same 
ones.  My companions and I are all members of the same 
club; we are all debaters or swimmers.  We share a common 
name or linguistic label, “tigers,” or in the case of national 
identity, “Columbian.”  I am Columbian, she is Columbian; 
we are all Columbians.  These are clues to my identity. 
 The structure of self can be metaphorically seen as being 
like an onion with layers upon layers of identities and 
psychological involvement or caring.  There are inner and 
outer layers.  They each have a psychological distance from 
my core being.  Thus, I cheer for my intramural basketball 
team against all other teams in my school.  But when my 
team is defeated and our school’s champions play against 
another school, then I cheer for my school’s champions even 
though they defeated the team I was on.  My allegiance, 
those who now count as “my” team, shifts to the team that 
represents my school and myself.  My caring shifts.  Then if 
my school is defeated by another team, which then becomes 
our city champions, again I shift to the/my city champions 
whom I identify with and cheer for.  When my city 
champions are playing against the city champions of another 
city then I cheer for my city’s champions who previously 
were my enemies.  Then, even if my city champions are 
defeated by the other city to become the state champions, 
when our state champion plays another state’s team, I cheer 
for my state’s team.  So it goes in concentric spheres of 
influence, allegiance, and emotional identity/attachment.   
 What would unify the planet and make us set aside our 
differences and animosities would be a common enemy 
attacking from another planet.  Under such circumstances, 
my personal, local, regional, and national identities would 
fade in importance.  Instead my planetary identity would 
emerge as a consequence of the appearance of a group from 
another planet.  Suddenly, it would not be salient to say I am 
Russian or Nigerian but...we are all humans unified at the 
level of species consciousness against an extraterrestrial 
enemy.   
 If you are from New Jersey and you visit San Francisco, 
being from New Jersey suddenly becomes a salient aspect of 
your identity.  When you were at home in New Jersey, you 
did not realize that you where a Jerseyite.  Similarly, when 
you are in the United State, the fact that you are American 
rarely crosses your mind.  But when you encounter a 
foreigner or if you go outside the US, then being American 
becomes an important part of your self-awareness.  Identity 
is a consequence of difference, and it affects all aspects of 
your life. 
 Language and the Self. Culture, as a way of life, 
becomes an important concept because it powerfully 
influences how an individual will act and react to the world 
at large.  To some extent, the self and culture are inseparable.  
The self is always a cultured being, a person who has been 
raised and enculturated by a larger group of people.  And so, 
to the degree that cultures vary around the globe, so too must 
there exist many different kinds of selves.  When a person 
says that they are Greek or Malaysian this expresses the 
identification that exists between the person and their culture 
and also very often their language.   
 Language is important to personal identity.  Language, 
culture, and self are very difficult to separate.  Language has 
always been a very sensitive subject because it involves 
peoples’ sense of community and identification.  In France, 
the Academe Francaise guards against the use of non-French 
words in public discourse.  As early as the ancient Taoists in 
what is now China, the ancient Jews in the Middle East, and 
the ancient sophists such as Isocrates in Greece, thinkers 
have believed that language acquisition is the same thing as 
acquiring the ability to think and acquiring an identity, 
indeed acquiring a cultural identity.  When children learn a 
language they learn a system that will structure not only what 
they can think about but also how they think about it.  This 
is called linguistic relativism and two of the most important 
scholars that have promoted this idea are Edward Sapir 
(1929) and Benjamin Whorf (1940).  The fact that a 
language is much more than just a list of names for objects 
and actions but a way of organizing cognition and emotion 
was first suggested in modern times by Wilhelm von 
Humboldt in  (1836 Ger./1999 Eng.).  This important insight 
later inspired Noam Chomsky (1957; 1965) to break with B. 
F. Skinner’s behaviorism, which reduced explanation of 
human events to simple correlations between observable 
behaviors, and launch what has come to be called 
cognitivism. Not unlike Immanual Kant (1781 Ger./1999 
Eng.), Chomsky argues that the mind is active and the mind 
is a consciousness structured or programmed by language, 
which enables not only conception but even certain forms of 
perception.  Hall (1966) puts it well:  
…the principles laid down by Whorf and his 
fellow linguists in relation to language apply to 
the rest of human behavior as well – in fact, to all 
culture.  It has long been believed that experience 
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is what all men [sic] share, that it is always 
possible somehow to bypass language and culture 
and to refer back to experience in order to reach 
another human being.  This implicit (and often 
explicit) belief concerning man’s [sic] relation to 
experience was based on the assumptions that, 
when two human beings are subject to the same 
“experience,” virtually the same data are being 
fed to the two central nervous systems and that the 
two brains record similarly…  research casts 
serious doubt on the validity of this assumption, 
particularly when the cultures are different… 
different cultures not only speak different 
languages but, what is possibly more important, 
inhabit different sensory worlds.  Selective 
screening of sensory data admits some things 
while filtering out others, so that experience as it 
is perceived through one set of culturally 
patterned sensory screens is quite different from 
experience perceived through another. (p. 2).    
 According to Sapir and Whorf and others, perception 
itself is effected by the language one speaks (Sapir/Whorf 
Hypothesis).  Very often languages contain words for 
phenomena like moods, objects, social roles, and so forth 
that do not exist in any other language.  For instance, Sapir 
(1929) discovered that the Inuit, a tribe of people who live 
above the Artic Circle readily identify over 20 different 
kinds of snow.  Sapir, had difficulty identifying many more 
than 3 or 4 kinds of snow like wet snow and dry snow.  He 
reasoned that this may in part be due to the upbringing of 
Inuit children.  Over the years they are taught how to identify 
different kinds of snow and the name of each distinct kind.  
As Aristotle argued, categorical naming is the essence of 
knowledge and knowing the different kinds of snow was 
crucial to the survival of a people who live in a world of 
snow.   
 Language is a powerful medium that gives a person a 
linguistic identity that also binds them with their linguistic 
community.   Language gives a person access to others and 
a shared tradition.  Language makes one a member of a 
group.  Since languages vary, so too do the types of thoughts 
and mindsets that different people have.  That is why 
translation from one language to another always involves 
interpretation.  That is also why perfect translation is never 
possible.  For instance, many social scientists like to talk 
about personal efficacy or a person’s belief their her 
“capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, 
and courses of action needed to exercise control over events 
in their lives” (Wood and Bandura, 1989, p. 364).  But this 
concept does not translate into many other languages such as 
Japanese.   
The Social Construction of the Self 
 The last element needed to understand the role of the self 
in cultural action is a discussion of the formation of the self. 
The structuration of my consciousness is largely a process 
that I am not, and indeed cannot be initially aware of.  The 
formation of my self, my language, my world, as such, is 
largely out of my control.  We are part of the field of 
experience.  As Michel Foucault (1966 Fr./1970 Eng.) 
following the insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, it is not so 
much that I speak a language as it speaks me, meaning that 
my language structured the world into which I was born and 
it shaped my very modes of conscious awareness.  We are 
an integral part of the ecology of meaning.  Who we become 
is not a matter of our own volition.  As developing children 
we cannot guide our own development consciously or 
according to our own intentions and principles.  Though 
everything is meaningful to us, what things mean to us, how 
we perceive and evaluate the world is largely beyond our 
control.  We are taught how to see the world, not in a formal 
classroom setting, but by being an active participant in the 
social world, by being an integral part of the ecology of 
meaning, which is not directional but a field of constant 
interactive and interpretive activity.  This is what Eric 
Kramer calls the field theory of human communication.  We 
are born into an already complex and operant semantic field.  
And when an immigrant crosses a boundary, she must 
contend with a new semantic field which includes not merely 
spoken language like vocabulary and grammar but also para-
linguistics such as when is it appropriate to laugh, when is it 
appropriate to be silent, is it appropriate to talk about 
yourself, when are jokes appropriate, what volume should I 
speak at, how does turn taking work, and so forth.  In Japan 
for instance what might be called personal efficacy regarding 
communication competence has more to do with being self-
controlled enough to remain silent and listen intently.  In the 
United States what counts as personal efficacy has more to 
do with being an eloquent speaker, witty, quick, will 
informed and so forth.  Also there are nonverbal codes that 
are difficult to master when crossing borders.     
 Because we are taught through daily experience how the 
world is, and because this form of “teaching” is an integral 
way of being in the socio-cultural life-world of our local 
experience, this constitutes the root of cultural differences.  
A person either is or is not attractive to us, before we can 
even think about it.  Martin Heidegger (1962) called this 
“prejudgment.”  Gadamer (2006) called it “prejudice.”  
For instance, Gadamer observed that before a critic can 
begin his or her analysis of a work of art, he or she has 
already judged that the object is a work of art.  We may even 
question our own judgments and ask ourselves why we think 
a certain girl is attractive and another is ugly to us.  But still, 
she remains pretty to us despite our reflective efforts to 
change our own perceptions after we have already seen her 
as pretty.  And as Gadamer (1960 Ger./2006 Eng.) has 
argued, even the Enlightenment’s pride in attacking 
prejudice is itself a prejudice.   
 Objectivists value, value-freedom.  They stand within 
and embody a tradition, which argues that traditionalism is 
an irrational prejudice. But this virtue is not universal.  
Standards of judgment and meanings vary across cultures.  
The judgment that ethnocentrism is bad is not itself a 
universal value.  Most cultures in fact believe that their way 
of life is the best.  Through contact, we may slowly come to 
appreciate the values, standards, beliefs and prejudices of 
others.  We cannot escape prejudice for prejudice enables us 
to perceive the world (Gadamer, 2006).  We always see the 
world from our personal point-of-view, which is limited, 
prejudiced.  Evaluation cannot be separated from 
experience.  A bit of data either is or is not of interest.  A girl 
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just is or is not pretty prior to any meta-evaluation of the 
judgment itself.  Perception is always already judgmental.   
 Immigrant Identity. Identity depends on the worldview 
it presumes.  This is a complex phenomenon that includes 
perceptions and presumptions about gender, race, group 
membership, caste, age, sectarian membership, tribal and 
familial membership, political affiliation, educational status, 
and so forth.  Typically identity is part of what Husserl (1913 
Ger./1982 Eng.) called the “natural attitude” which means 
that it is a belief that is so taken for granted that it does not 
occur to one to question it, that it is “natural” and inherent.  
One’s identity often seems “normal,” “natural,” utterly 
“real”; presupposed.  Very often it never occurs to someone 
to question their own identity.   However, one moment when 
identity becomes salient or even problematized and visible 
is when a person crosses a boundary and becomes Other.  
This indicates that identity is neither fixed nor wholly 
inherent but very much a social construct sustained by 
interaction and communication.   
 Identity is a meaning.  And many meanings, unlike 
physical objects, can occupy the same time and “place.”  
Qualitatively, identities are not the same as physical objects.  
We can have cognitive dissonance.  But more important to 
human beings perhaps, as their behaviors are usually based 
on what things mean to them, is that we often experience 
emotional or affective dissonance, which means that we are 
not sure how we feel about a relationship, event, object, or 
action (Isa and Kramer, 2003; Kramer, 1997; 2003a; 2003b).  
For example should I “put down” my old pet?  How do I feel 
about that action, about my old friend, about everything?  
What is the “right” thing to do?   
 Identity is a form of difference which means that all 
identities are co-constitutive phenomena (Nietzsche, 1882 
Ger./1974 Eng.; Saussure, 1916 Fr./1977 Eng.; Heidegger, 
1957 Ger./1969 Eng.; Kramer, 1993).  An identity is the 
liminal moment between the text of self and the context of 
one’s semantic ecology (including but not restricted to the 
environment).  For instance, I am never so aware of my 
American citizenship identity as when I am living abroad.  
At home it fades into the background of my existence and I 
may not even own a passport.  To an immigrant, identity is 
very much more a salient aspect of being.  To recall 
Husserl’s (1913 Ger./1982), Max Scheler’s (1921 Ger./1960 
Eng.), Alfred Schutz’ (1942; 1970), and Irving Goffman’s 
(1959) terminology, identity in everday life or the 
Lebenswelt (life world) can flux between the background 
and foreground of a person’s being. 
 Human beings live in a world of meaning.  Meanings are 
not empirical objects.  Just as it would not occur to a person 
to ask what color logic is or how much mathematics weighs 
or how many meters science is, so too it makes no sense to 
ask what color a meaning is or how much it weighs.  The 
human life-world is what Kramer (2009; 1997) calls a 
semantic field, a milieu of countless meanings (including 
identifying a phenomenon as empirical) that fluxes with time 
and mobility (social, economic, geographic, political, 
psychological, and so forth).  Meanings influence each other 
with synergies just as colors and sounds complement and 
clash.  Semantic dissonance is basically a clash of meanings. 
 Identity is not a thing but a process that is most evident 
in threshold experiences.  It makes no sense to ask what color 
my identity is or how long it is or how much it weighs.  It is 
not an empirical object but instead it is, like all of conscious 
experience, a set of relationships that are in flux, sometimes 
very much and sometimes less so.  As such identity is never 
a finished product.  And in most cases it has no sense of 
progress or maturation because there is no final goal to 
“personal growth” or change that would allow one to speak 
in such measured terms.  In order to measure “progress,” in 
something like personal growth or assimilation, one would 
have to first posit a final goal.  In life, identity-change can 
be directional as when one is striving to become a doctor or 
a police officer.  But overall identity is not directional.  
Identities are rarely fixed.  A person can be disbarred, fired, 
divorced, become rich, become ill, even change their sex.  
Even age as a state of mind and social status is not a simple 
fact or number.  And the most “inherent” characteristics of a 
person such as their “race,” can be redefined by social 
conditions. 
 Otherness and marginalization do not always mean being 
weak but they do evoke from the immigrant greater effort 
and an increase in ecological complexity which is reflected 
in an increase in cognitive, and often affective, complexity.  
For a sojourner the semantic field “thickens,” to borrow a 
term from Geertz (1973).  Everything, even the most 
mundane processes and objects suddenly seem salient, 
become more prominent in one’s consciousness.  For 
instance, when this author first moved to Bulgaria just after 
the end of the Cold War, I was confronted with a world of 
practices, beliefs, and objects that were new to me.  Due to a 
lack of advertising, downtown Sofia, the capital city, seemed 
drab compared to all other cities I was familiar with.  Even 
light switches I noticed had a different design than I was used 
to.  For the sojourner, food, clothing, rules for crossing 
streets, for how to use a public telephone, all become 
prominent in awareness and this sudden foregrounding of so 
many experiences greatly increases the affective and 
cognitive labor for the newcomer.  This increase in cognitive 
complexity and cognitive effort is not limited to being 
compelled to translate between two or more languages much 
of the time.  Life abroad is more complicated and difficult 
than life in one’s place of primary socialization.   
 When one crosses a boundary and becomes marginalized 
this means that one is not automatically included via social 
ritual and scripted behavior (Schutz, 1970).  Upon breeching 
the boundary, suddenly interaction is no longer routinized 
and normative.  Instead it becomes laborious -- effortful.  
The involuntary becomes voluntary, subconscious behavior 
rises to the threshold of awareness.  Self monitor and other-
monitoring increases (Gangestad and Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 
1974).  All of this means that interaction becomes more 
complex which means that options must be weighed in the 
moment and cognitive labor increases and with it feelings of 
frustration.  The simplest task, such as mailing a letter or 
plugging in one’s laptop, can become difficult.  For instance, 
when I was living in Bulgaria, I had to go to the principle of 
the American School in Sofia and enlist his aid in getting an 
electric converter that would work and those came from 
neighboring Greece.  So I had to wait for a converter, which 
weighed about five pounds, to be delivered.  In the meantime 
he lent a precious one to me.  So just plugging in my laptop 
became much more complicated and laborious because it 
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was not compatible with the larger system.  The same could 
be said of me and many of my beliefs, attitudes, 
expectations, and value judgments.   
 After reviewing scores of definitions, Kramer (1997) 
defines culture as a set of shared beliefs, attitudes, 
expectations, motivations, values, and behavior patterns.  As 
such, immigrant identity is very much a process of 
intercultural communication and negotiation.     
 Since life complexity increases greatly for immigrants it 
is important to understand the stresses immigrants are under.  
Kramer (2000b) postulates that all organisms behaviorally 
converge on a fairly narrow set or repertoire of activities, 
beliefs and expectations, patterns, even though they may be 
very capable of a much broader variety of thoughts and 
behaviors.  Humans often settle into what is sometimes 
called a rut.  Kramer (2005) argues that there is a very good 
and simple reason for this routinization of thinking and 
behavior.  Behavior becomes scripted and routinized in order 
to save energy for the organism (Kramer, 2005).  Too much 
novelty in a person’s life can lead to too much mental and 
physical stress.  Simply put, a person tires rather quickly of 
too much excitement and so we see the famous “U” curve in 
studies of culture shock (Oberg, 1960; Kramer, 2000b).   
 At first for the immigrant all the new surroundings are 
exciting and fun but typically within a month or so people 
begin to become home sick and this then can deepen into true 
clinical depression.  If they can stick it out, or are forced to 
stay, within about a year’s time things begin to become 
normalized and psychological stress alleviates.  In sporting 
terms, even though all the rules and positions may be 
essentially the same, when a player moves into a higher 
league, a more challenging environment as when an player 
moves from the high school ranks to the college ranks and 
from college into professional competition they are at first 
overwhelmed, but as their exposure to the “new game” 
continues, it begins to “slow down” for them as they adjust.  
A very similar process of adjustment occurs for the 
immigrant sojourner.  This is not, as Gudykunst and Kim 
(2003) argue, a form of “evolution” because evolution has 
no purpose or direction but is instead a random process from 
asteroid impacts to climate change (Gould, 1996; Dawkins, 
1996).  Gudykunst and Kim (2003) also confuse adaptation 
with learning which is incorrect.  Evolution and adaptation 
have no transcending purpose, no design, no final goal, and 
no progress.  This is not the case with immigrants who wish 
to achieve greater economic, linguistic, and cultural 
integration.   
 The process of settling in is one of adjustment (not 
“psychic evolution”) to the predominant culture an 
immigrant finds herself in.  The acculturation and 
adjustment process is also not a zero-sum process as 
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) argue whereby a sojourner or 
newcomer “adapts” to her new circumstances only to the 
extent that she “unlearns” her old identity and ways, what 
Gudykunst and Kim call willful “deculturation” (see pp. 
358-364).  Rather, according to Kramer (2000b) the 
newcomer learns new ways that are appropriate in her new 
circumstance, which involves added to her repertoire of 
cultural literacy and communication competencies.  If and 
when she “goes home” she has not forgotten how to behave 
“back there,” simply as a function of learning how to get 
along in her adopted homeland.  Gudykunst and Kim posit a 
process that is variable analytic in style so that the more one 
adapts to a new homeland the more one must unlearn one’s 
old identity.  This variable analytical style of thinking is 
inappropriate to the reality of immigrant adjustment.  
Empirical evidence proves that this simply is not how a 
newcomer adjusts to her new circumstances (Croucher, 
2009; Iwakuma, forthcoming 2010).  She learns new ways 
without having to “unlearn” her old identity and ways; 
without having to “deculturize” herself as Gudykunst and 
Kim claim.   
 Culture shock is characterized by a sense that living is 
difficult.  When interaction is effortful because it is not 
ordinary or routine, it becomes laborious and so it is 
completely expected that an immigrant facing this sort of 
struggle to communicate and navigate an unfamiliar 
semantic field, may well seek to self-segregate or keep to 
herself, at least part of the time in order to rest and integrate 
all the new experiences she is encountering.  This behavior 
is what Kramer (frothcoming) calls enclaving.   
The Enclave 
 Volunteerism is less the case with refugee identity.  But 
in the case of both the refugee and the immigrant, we notice 
that the sojourner often seeks refuge among their “own kind” 
in conversations of “their” language and may seek to 
physically and psychologically withdraw from time-to-time 
to essentially rest and make sense in their own fashion of all 
the new experiences they are being exposed to.  This 
involves personal time and space, in a word territoriality.  All 
animals need a sense of territory where they feel safe and in 
control (Hall, 1966; Morris, 1969).  Humans are the same.  
When a person cannot retreat into a time and space they 
control then we see a breakdown in their psychology and 
their patterns of behavior (Calhoun, 1983; Morris, 1969).     
 The enclave is an essential and common aspect of 
immigrant identity.  Enclave implies membership; 
belonging.  An enclave is a place of cooperation where 
behavior can run more on subconscious scripted patterns.  
The world is more implicit than explicit, less problematical.  
Enclaving is not an economic process but rather a psycho-
cultural process that can have economic consequences as 
when Chinese open a Chinese language bank in China town.  
Whether one is speaking of the relatively poor Latino barrios 
of Los Angeles or the enclave of Chinese immigrants in 
wealthy Flushing, New York, the felt need to retreat into the 
familiar is the same.  The enclave is not merely space.  It is 
a place inscribed with signification.  It is in the simplest 
terms a territorial phenomenon and like all territoriality, such 
places often seem to outsiders insular and aggressively 
defended.  The irony here is that the immigrant may well feel 
that the local folk aggressively defend the larger society 
from difference.  It has to do with a sense of belonging.  This 
in essence means identity and co-ownership.  This is my 
neighborhood and I belong to it.  This is my “mother tongue” 
and I belong to it.   
 Enclaving may take the form of refuge and retreat into a 
familiar cuisine, a familiar style of music, movies and 
television from the home culture, spending time visiting 
Internet websites created and maintained by people from the 
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home culture, and so forth.  For isolated individuals such as 
many foreign students, their dorm room may be their enclave 
and their favorite Internet web sites their destinations of 
escape from a strange world.  Because life for the immigrant 
is complicated and stressful, enclaving is an attempt to 
retreat from time to time into a comfort zone of the familiar 
where one can relax from being constantly vigilant and also 
feel reconnected with their home world.  The relative 
certainty of the familiar helps to alleviate anxiety (Berger 
and Calabresse, 1975).  As Nietzsche (1882 Ger./1974 Eng.) 
noted, to be familiar with something means to “know” it.  
Otherness implies uncertainty, mystery, and this can lead to 
a feeling of anxiety about “the stranger” on both sides of the 
relationship.  The best way to reduce that anxiety is to 
become familiar with each other.        
 When Otherness as a function of differentiation occurs, 
communication patterns shift making issues like trust, 
confidence, and self-efficacy salient.  When one crosses a 
boundary one becomes either a minority or a majority as 
such.  One becomes a “member,” either of an “in-group” or 
“out-group” as such, and this sense of differentiation 
depends on the context.  In fact a person is a member of both 
an in-group and an out-group at the same time depending on 
perspective.  As soon as one identifies with an in-group, out-
groups are implied.   
 Identity is given through difference (Saussure, 1916 
Fr./1977 Eng.; Heidegger, 1957 Ger./1969 Eng.).  Identity is 
a co-constituted phenomenon (Kramer, 1993).  Identity is 
thus, at least in part, a social construct (Schutz, 1953; Schutz 
and Luckmann, 1959 Ger./1973 Eng.; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967; Goffman, 1959; Garfinkel, 1964/1972).  
This shifting aspect of identity increases with mobility.  It is 
co-evolutionary, co-constitutive in nature.     
 The shifting quality of identity occurs as both a mundane 
aspect of human reality and sometimes as an extra-ordinary 
occurrence.  It is rooted in the temporal nature of our being.  
Time, as Husserl (1917 Ger./1964 Eng.) pointed out in his 
study Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, 
which Heidegger was editing and borrowing from as he 
wrote his own magnum opus, Being and Time, which in turn 
has had a profound influence on the work of Jacques Derrida 
(1967 Fr./1980 Eng.; 1972 Fr./1981 Eng.) with his emphasis 
on difference, time is of the essence of human awareness 
including self-awareness and identity.   
 Changes in identity are constant but are most pronounced 
in threshold experiences.  It occurs, for instance, when 
someone “middle aged” comes upon a group of teenagers 
and becomes “middle-aged” and “inappropriate” as such, or 
when one enters a strange temple, or when one finds herself 
in the “wrong” neighborhood,” or when a foreigner joins 
one’s work team, or when an authority such as a high level 
boss sits down to have lunch with a crew of laborers.  What 
happens is that difference and therefore identity suddenly 
comes into focus and this alters the mood, the pattern of 
communication, and the sense of self as inclusive or 
exclusive, as belonging or as intruding, as being appropriate 
or inappropriate. With cognitive uncertainty comes anxiety 
about the unfamiliar.  
 For instance, when a high level authority suddenly 
appears in a factory cafeteria where he rarely ventures and 
sits down with a work crew to “mingle” and “connect,” often 
the discourse that constitutes the crew as a group suddenly 
stops due to intimidation and suspicion.  The manager may 
not get the sort of candid feedback he hoped for due to his 
very presence.  So the anonymous “suggestion box” often 
works better at facilitating communication. 
Dependency   
 Diplomacy, the mediation of problem situations, takes 
many channels.  For this reason, immigrants who have 
difficulties in navigating their newly adopted world often 
identify and cling to anyone who comes from their home but 
who has more experience and competence.  Usually it is a 
more established “homey” who immigrated earlier and 
knows more about the host environment.  This clinging can 
become problematic.  Often the newcomer’s reliance on an 
oldcomer works well at first but if the dependency 
relationship continues for very long the oldcomer will seek 
to escape the relationship.  This avoidance behavior can take 
many forms ranging from just not returning phone calls to a 
blunt face-to-face confrontation where the oldcomer tells the 
newcomer that they can no longer take care of them.  Initially 
the oldcomer may be happy to show the newcomer once or 
twice how to sign up for utilities and pay bills, how to enroll 
in school, give them rides for groceries, get them started in 
the immigration and naturalization process, help them get an 
apartment and so forth but usually within a few months such 
dependency starts to strain the relationship.  Such a dyad 
used for enclaving has limited utility.  This is where less 
casual professionals in organizations and institutions such as 
court interpreters, ombudsmen, human relations negotiators, 
and social services workers can become great helpers to the 
immigrant.  As professionals they can remain fairly 
anonymous while at the same time offering needed 
assistance to the immigrant with daily chores and unusual 
problems such as health care and legal predicaments.  They 
can act as midwives to the birth of the immigrant’s new 
identity. 
Co-Constitutional and Co-Evolutionary Identity 
Formation 
 Difference, Otherness, is the essence of identity.  Identity 
is invisible without the existence of Otherness.  Emotions, 
attitudes, and evaluations such as pride and prejudice are 
fundamentally linked to the sense of Otherness in all its 
manifestations including inclusion and exclusion.  Identity is 
essentially a perspective and the bias of perspective is never 
more apparent than when confronted with difference.  But as 
Nietzsche (1882 Ger./1974 Eng.)  and Gadamer (1960 
Ger./2006 Eng.) point out, perspectivism is not a bad thing 
as one might presume if one ironically takes the 
Enlightenment perspective that presents a powerful bias 
against prejudice and “subjectivism.”  As Nietzsche and 
Gadamer demonstrate, perspective, bias, in a word 
subjectivity, is a necessary condition for any perception and 
knowledge to exist.  Knowledge is another word for being 
familiar with a thing.  Only subjects can be “familiar” and 
know.  Objects do not know.  The more familiar you become 
with a task, situation, event, or thing, the better you are said 
to know it.  And the more you know of a host culture the less 
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anxious about it you are likely to be.  Hence, culture shock 
slowly eases over time.   
 This is the case with an immigrant as he or she integrates 
into a host society.  But integration here does not mean 
becoming the same as locals for integration is not 
homogenization.  Integration involves cultural fusion 
(Kramer, 2000b; 2002; 2003b) whereby subjects, conscious 
people encounter a host cultural form adopt it and, in the 
process, add their accent to it.  Examples from multicultural 
societies are innumerable.  A few are curry hamburgers, 
playing jazz with traditional Japanese instruments, adding 
Polynesian warrior dances to an American college football 
pregame routine, and so forth.  Influence is not a bad thing.  
Immigrants influence the societies into which they move and 
are also influenced by those societies.  They are 
consciousness structures or emotional and cognitive systems 
that meet and mix (Gebser, 1949 Ger./1985 Eng.).  While 
assimilationists argue that the “evolutionary” goal of an 
immigrant should be to adopt the host culture’s predominant 
mode of thinking, acting, and even feeling, what they call 
cognitive, behavioral, and affective “functional fitness” 
(“intercultural adaptation”) as much as possible, the reality 
of immigrant experience is a co-evolutionary processes 
whereby the host culture and the sojourner communicate – 
exchange, interpret and borrow some of each other’s ways 
(Kramer, 2000b; 2002; 2003b).   
 Cultural fusion is a theory of intercultural 
communication.  It presupposes hundreds of years of 
hermeneutic research and observation in interpretation 
studies and accepts the hermeneutic tenet put forth by 
Nietzsche and later Heidegger, that the human condition is 
fundamentally a process of interpretation, making sense of 
experience.  The hermeneutic process presumes that all 
interaction involves interpretation, a process of making 
sense of one’s surroundings including Others’ behaviors.  
And this process of making sense always presumes one’s 
own perspective.  Without a perspective a person cannot 
make sense of anything.  And so, all human experience is 
limited but without limitation there is no sense making, no 
knowing.  Cultural fusion thus explains how immigrants 
make sense of their adopted homelands.  Because of 
perspectivism everyone has an accent, each person has a 
particular take on the world.  People who share a common 
cosmology and more or less common history and experience 
tend to share a common way of seeing the world, a common 
accent on perception and conception.   
 Given the fundamental tenet of perspectivism in 
hermeneutics, which is presumed by the theory of cultural 
fusion, the theory of intercultural adaptation put forth by 
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) is utterly unworkable; false.  
From the point-of-view of cultural fusion theory and the 
empirical studies that back it up (Croucher, 2009; Iwakuma, 
forthcoming 2014; Jafri, 2008) the basic advise put forth by 
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) that if an immigrant wishes to 
be “mature,” “well adjusted,” “functionally fit,” 
“communicatively competent,” “sane,” “integrated,” they 
must willfully “unlearn” and “deculturize” themselves, to 
“disintegrate” psychologically and erase their original 
identity so that they may be reintegrated as a better more 
“appropriate” person, is fundamentally and necessarily false.  
Given the empirical data of large scale studies noted above, 
the immigrant or refugee sojourner does not have to 
disintegrate their own original self-identity to be 
“successful” in their adopted land.  In fact, and very much 
the opposite, the immigrant must rely on the abilities and 
personal assets that they bring to the new situation in order 
to make any sense of it and to be able to learn and integrate 
new ways.   
Co-Integration 
 At the social level, integration is really co-integration.  
Communication is not a one-way process.  While what 
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) call “conformity pressure” is 
exerted one-way on to minority immigrants by the numerical 
majority of the host population is real, it is not, and cannot 
completely overwhelm the immigrant’s mind.  If it did they 
would be like an erased computer memory, having no 
operating system left with which to translate and interpret 
(make sense of) their new world even if and even though that 
interpretation must be accented.  Like the co-constitution of 
identity and the co-evolutionary process whereby a society 
both changes and is changed by immigrants who move in 
joining the living process of society as a system, a semantic 
field (Kramer, 1997; 2000b), integration is also a 
communicative process.  Integration is co-integration.  In 
short “both sides” influence each other.   
 Conformity pressure exists on “both sides” or in both 
directions.  And the intensity of the pressure cannot, as 
Gudykunst and Kim (2003) argue, be reduced to simple 
quantification.  A single missionary entering a village can 
have tremendous influence.   
 The immigrant is always already a part of the psycho-
social system into which they move.  But according to the 
theoretical construct of Gudykunst and Kim’s intercultural 
adaptation theory, the immigrant adds nothing to the system 
but must “progress” in and “upward-forward” direction 
toward the “mainstream” host culture or fail.  It is a neo-
Spencerian social Darwinian theory that justifies forced 
conformity applied by an official national culture to all 
newcomers (Kramer, 2000b; 2000c).    
 The immigrant Other is always already a part of the 
social system into which they move.  Integration presumes 
differences, perspectives that persist even as they influence 
each other and change.  The perspectives that are manifest 
hermeneutic horizons do the integrating.  Accent in ways of 
talking, walking, dancing, arguing, doing friendship and so 
forth are inevitable.  Diversity is the antidote to routinized 
and simplified cognition -- boredom.  Boredom is a natural 
state for human beings and they tend to seek to avoid it.  Too 
much boredom due to a lack of diversity in experience, can 
easily lead to depression.  Multicultural boarder zones such 
as ports are very dynamic places to live and tend to attract 
large populations of people in part because they are 
stimulating environments that offer not just economic 
opportunity but stimulus opportunity.  In short, Otherness is 
stimulating.  This is not to say that the presence of Otherness 
does not sometimes lead to conflict.  But the theory of 
cultural fusion, unlike Gudykunst and Kim’s theory of 
intercultural adaptation does not make value judgments 
about which kinds of behavior and interaction are good and 
bad.  While they present a plan of social and psychological 
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engineering calling it a social scientific theory, the theory of 
cultural fusion does not posit a utopian goal such as the 
elimination of all conflict or misunderstanding11. 
 All perception, all knowledge is meaningful and useful 
not in spite of, but because of its limited scope.  For instance, 
a telescope has a prejudice a perspective built into its very 
structure so that it is useless for studying microbes.  But this 
does not invalidate the perspective that a telescope can 
render.  Its use-value, its validity is conditional.  It has a 
limited hermeneutic horizon.  A microscope is “better” for 
studying microbes than a telescope.  However, “better” 
depends on context, on interest and on the relationship 
between the knower and the known.  The built in limitations 
of a telescope make it “better” for studying stars than a 
microscope – if that is one’s interest.   
 The point is that perspective essentially involves bias, 
limitation, prejudice but such prejudice not only blinds one 
to some realities while it also enables one to see others.  And 
identity is comprised of the interaction of various 
perspectives within the process of social intercourse.  
Perspective is inescapable.  It is also essential to our ability 
to know anything at all even as it blinds us to some things.  
When one thing comes into focus, others go out of focus.  
This is the nature of knowing and knowing is based on 
differentiation, the ability to identify things as distinct from 
one another, to be able to define them by recognizing 
boundaries.  To know means to fragment.  Precision in 
knowing is based on fragmentation (Kramer, 1997; 2005).  
The greater the fragmentation of a field the more precise our 
knowing.  So we say that a clock that measures seconds 
rather than just minutes is more precise than a clock that 
cannot measure “down to” the discrete, identifiable, 
knowable second. 
 To be an immigrant, to be identified as such and to see 
oneself that way is not an empirical phenomenon.  Rather, it 
is a relationship that has no color or weight.  It is a meaning 
that varies as the foreground and background of experience 
shifts.  To be an immigrant has various meanings depending 
on the context, the human ecology that is constituted of the 
civilizational and cultural interface that is the necessary 
condition for immigration to exist and consequently for the 
identification of “immigrant” to exist.  The more 
homogeneous a group the less individuals are identifiable as 
unique.  The moment a person steps into a group that she is 
not a member of and becomes Other or the moment someone 
steps into your group and is Other, homogeneity, the quality 
of sameness or similarity gives way to heterogeneity.  In the 
real world of immigration the process of identity 
morphogenesis (Kramer, 1993; 1997) is complex and ever-
present.  Being dependent on difference for its very 
existence, identity changes as differences change.   
                                                          
1 See Gudykunst and Kim’s (2003) lengthy plan to 
include public schools in an effort to create 
“intercultural persons” with the right kind of 
personality traits such as flexibility and “open-
mindedness” (pp. 369-370) to make a better world 
where cultural differences are ultimately eliminated.  
To this author this is a hopelessly idealistic and in 
some ways disconcerting plan of action which 
presumes that culture categorically is a “defilement” 
 For instance the immigrant experience and sense of 
identity is different for a French physician from Paris 
moving to Los Angeles as compared to a Naga tribesman 
from Northern Myanmar.  Also the experience of being an 
immigrant is different for a Parisian physician moving to Los 
Angles as compared to rural Ethiopia.  In fact our Parisian 
doctor will have a different sense of self if she moves from 
urban Paris to a rural French village.   
 For our purposes, it is postulated that the various 
combinations of such different structures leads to different 
configurations of identity including the identity of 
sojourners between and among the different cultures and 
cultural families or civilizations.  Identity is a fluid 
phenomenon.  It is a momentary nexus of meanings and 
expectations that influence human behavior and ways of 
communicating and interacting.  While it often seems to be 
the most permanent, the most “basic” and “inherent” quality 
of things, identity is actually an emergent phenomenon.  And 
yet, this fact itself is transcendent.  Despite the endless 
adumbrations of immigrant identity, the phenomenological 
analysis indicates that all immigrants share an essential 
experience, which is Otherness.  The quality of this 
experience can be pleasant or unpleasant, satisfying or 
unsatisfying, friendly or unfriendly.   
 However, no matter the valence of how the experience is 
perceived, in all cases it involves the realization of what 
Ernst Jentsch (1906 Ger./1995 Eng.) and Sigmund Freud 
(1919 Ger./2003 Eng.) called the uncanny.  The uncanny is 
the paradoxical experience of something or someone who is 
both familiar and foreign at the same time.  The immigrant 
to the host and the host to the immigrant can very well seem 
uncanny.  The strangeness of difference can be fascinating 
and/or frightening, curiously pleasing while alienating, 
liberating while lonely, in essence, more or less sublime in 
the most profound sense for it involves self-realization and a 
heightened sense of self-monitoring and also a heightened 
effort at observing the ways of the Other. 
Conclusion 
 Everyone has a unique perception of the world.  This 
perception is based on culture, experience, personality, and 
identity.  The self is the culminating result of the intersection 
of these phenomena.  It is important to note that the self is 
never finished.  We change, are changed, and through our 
influence promote change in others.  This difference in us, 
our surroundings and others, is what makes life so 
interesting.  We want to travel.  We want to learn new things, 
have different experiences.  These diverse encounters 
invigorate us.  They make us more than what we were, and 
we like that.   
(p. 384) and should be eliminated, and also presumes 
to know not only human nature but what is best about 
the future of all humans, which is basically to “rise 
above the hidden forces of culture” (p. 385) to 
generate what this author has called a global 
monoculture elsewhere (Kramer, 2003a).   Of course 
the elimination of culture would also eliminate human 
life as we know it and Gudykunst and Kim propose 
exactly that. 
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 And this is probably why you are reading this text—to 
gain some understanding of how to most effectively manage 
intercultural encounters.  This text will give you some of that 
but this is not its aim or ultimate purpose.  The best way to 
develop a multicultural mindset is to understand how you 
and others make sense of the lifeworld.  This is the ultimate 
goal of this text, to discuss the process of becoming 
intercultural through understanding the Other.  Learning to 
behave interculturally is superficial in contrast, and will only 
come permanently with an awareness and understanding of 
the multicultural process.    
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